Metaphors may create realities for us, especially social realities<\/strong>. A metaphor may thus be a guide for future action. Such actions will, of course, fit the metaphor. This will, in turn, reinforce the power of the metaphor to make experience coherent. In this sense metaphors can be self-fulfilling prophecies.<\/p>\nFor example, faced with the energy crisis, President Carter declared “the moral equivalent of war.” The WAR metaphor generated a network of entailments. There was an “enemy,” a “threat to national security,” which required “setting targets,” “reorganizing priorities,” “establishing a new chain of command,” “plotting new strategy,” “gathering intelligence,” “marshaling forces,” “imposing sanctions,” “calling for sacrifices,” and on and on. The WAR metaphor highlighted certain realities and hid others. The metaphor was not merely a way of viewing reality; it constituted a license for policy change and political and economic action. [ com quan la dreta qualifica de l’intent de referendum com a cop d’estat]<\/p>\n
Metaphors, as we have seen, are conceptual in nature. They are among our principal vehicles for understanding. And they play a central role in the construction of social and political reality. Yet they are typically viewed within philosophy as matters of “mere language,” and philosophical discussions of metaphor have not centered on their conceptual nature, their contribution to understanding, or their function in cultural reality. Instead, philosophers have tended to look at metaphors as out-of-the-ordinary imaginative or poetic linguistic expressions, and their discussions have centered on whether these linguistic expressions can be true. Their concern with truth comes out of a concern with objectivity: truth for them means objective, absolute truth. The typical philosophical conclusion is that metaphors cannot directly state truths, and, if they can state truths at all, it is only indirectly, via some non-metaphorical “literal” paraphrase.<\/p>\n
[En quin sentit pot ser veritat una met\u00e0fora nova? Ens aporta una nova manera de veure les coses]<\/p>\n
Exemple: Let us now ask what is involved in understanding as true the nonconventional metaphor “Life’s . . . a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing.” This non-conventional metaphor evokes the conventional metaphor LIFE IS A STORY. If we in fact view our lives and the lives of others in this way, then we would take the metaphor as being true. What makes it possible for many of us to see this metaphor as true is that we usually comprehend our life experiences in terms of the LIFE IS A STORY metaphor. We are constantly looking for meaning in our lives by seeking out coherences that will fit some sort of coherent life story. And we constantly tell such stories and live in terms of them. As the circumstances of our lives change, we constantly revise our life stories, seeking new coherence.<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
\nEpistemologia, objectivisme i subjectivisme<\/p>\n
Any adequate theory of the human conceptual system will have to give an account of how concepts are (1) grounded, (2) structured, (3) related to each other, and (4) defined. So far we have given a provisional account of grounding, structuring, and relations among concepts (subcategorization, metaphorical entailment, part, participant, etc.) for what we take to be typical cases. We have argued, moreover, that most of our conceptual system is metaphorically structured and have given a brief account of what that means.<\/p>\n
[ la met\u00e0fora es basa en l’experi\u00e8ncia i les similaritats – encara que ells ho rebutgen ], l’abstracci\u00f3 i l’homon\u00edmia no l’expliquen b\u00e9.<\/p>\n
Concepts are not defined solely in terms of inherent properties; instead, they are defined primarily in terms of interactional properties.<\/p>\n
What we are offering in the experientialist account of understanding and truth is an alternative which denies that subjectivity and objectivity are our only choices. We reject the objectivist view that there is absolute and unconditional truth without adopting the subjectivist alternative of truth as obtainable only through the imagination, unconstrained by external circumstances<\/strong>. The reason we have focused so much on metaphor is that it unites reason and imagination<\/strong>. Reason, at the very least, involves categorization, entailment, and inference. Imagination, in one of its many aspects, involves seeing one kind of thing in terms of another kind of thing\u2014what we have called metaphorical thought. Metaphor is thus imaginative rationality<\/strong>. Since the categories of our everyday thought are largely metaphorical and our everyday reasoning involves metaphorical entailments and inferences, ordinary rationality is therefore imaginative by its very nature. Given our understanding of poetic metaphor in terms of metaphorical entailments and inferences, we can see that the products of the poetic imagination are, for the same reason, partially rational in nature.<\/p>\n[ l’objectivisme erra quan atribueix als objectes propietats independents de la nostra interaci\u00f3 i experi\u00e8ncia amb ells. El subjectivisme erra quan pret\u00e9n que els conceptes i la imaginaci\u00f3 poden ser arbitraris. ] [aix\u00f2 no \u00e9s nou, Piaget ja parlava d’assimilaci\u00f3 i acomodaci\u00f3; \u00e9s el mateix que en l’evoluci\u00f3 i , modifiquem l’entorn i som modificats alhora quan ens hi adaptem]<\/p>\n
\nLa import\u00e0ncia de les met\u00e0fores anb qu\u00e8 veiem el m\u00f3n i vivim<\/p>\n
How we think metaphorically matters. It can determine questions of war and peace, economic policy, and legal decisions, as well as the mundane choices of everyday life. Is a military attack a “rape,” “a threat to our security,” or “the defense of a population against terrorism”? The same attack can be conceptualized in any of these ways with very different military consequences. Is your marriage a partner-ship, a journey through life together, a haven from the out-side world, a means for growth, or a union of two people into a third entity?<\/p>\n
The heart of metaphor is inference. Conceptual metaphor allows inferences in sensory-motor domains (e.g., domains of space and objects) to be used to draw inferences about other domains (e.g., domains of subjective judgment, with concepts like intimacy, emotions, justice, and so on). Because we reason in terms of metaphor, the metaphors we use determine a great deal about how we live our lives.<\/p>\n
\nResum<\/p>\n
The theory of metaphor has come a long way from the humble beginnings presented in this slim volume. Yet, most of the key ideas in this book have been either sustained or developed further by recent empirical research in cognitive linguistics and in cognitive science generally. These key ideas are the following:<\/p>\n
\n- Metaphors are fundamentally conceptual in nature; metaphorical language is secondary.<\/li>\n
- Conceptual metaphors are grounded in everyday experience.<\/li>\n
- Abstract thought is largely, though not entirely, metaphorical.<\/li>\n
- Metaphorical thought is unavoidable, ubiquitous, and mostly unconscious.<\/li>\n
- Abstract concepts have a literal core but are extended by metaphors, often by many mutually inconsistent metaphors.<\/li>\n
- Abstract concepts are not complete without metaphors. For example, love is not love without metaphors of magic, attraction, madness, union, nurturance, and so on.<\/li>\n
- Our conceptual systems are not consistent overall, since the metaphors used to reason about concepts may be inconsistent.<\/li>\n
- We live our lives on the basis of inferences we derive via metaphor.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
\nNotes inventari invscult, pendent d’integrar<\/p>\n
Quan pensem en el conjunt de frases usem per descriure una part de la realitat, m\u00e9s enll\u00e0 dels mots individuals, per exemple una discussi\u00f3, una guerra, la construcci\u00f3 o l’elaboraci\u00f3 d’una teoria, es veu el que Lakoff i Johnson han anomenat estructura met\u00e0f\u00f2rica del nostre sistema conceptual. [No deia Arist\u00f2til que la realitat es pot dir de moltes maneres?] Veurem la met\u00e0fora a recursos ret\u00f2rics (C2540) per\u00f2 aqu\u00ed avancem que consisteix a descriure una situaci\u00f3 en termes d’una altra. Per aix\u00f2 hi ha d’haver una certa identitat estructural entre substituens i substituendum. Vol dir que la percepci\u00f3 de l’estructura de les parts i el seu paper en el conjunt revela similituds. (Veure la noci\u00f3 de esquema o visi\u00f3 conjunta a xarxes neuronals H1XXX). Concebir una situaci\u00f3 en termes d’una altra de m\u00e9s coneguda sembla un procediment fonamental del nostra sistema conceptual. La met\u00e0fora il.lumina sobre el substituens, per\u00f2 com que la identitat estructural nom\u00e9s \u00e9s parcial tamb\u00e9 amaga i pot dur a extrapolacions: Una teoria pot estar “est\u00e0 ben constru\u00efda” per\u00f2 no “necessita amoblar-se”.<\/p>\n
Aix\u00ed quan parlem d’una discussi\u00f3 ho fem en termes de batalla: “Ataca el seu oponent amb arguments de pes”, “Defens\u00e0 la tesi”. La identitat estructural rau en que hi ha dues o m\u00e9s parts en conflicte. En parlar d’una teoria podem dir que “est\u00e0 s\u00f2lidament constru\u00efda”, o que “No s’aguanta per enlloc” indicant que consta de diverses parts (dades, arguments) jerarquitzades que s’aguanten les unes a les altres. \u00c9s gaireb\u00e9 impossible explciar inform\u00e0tica i telecomunicacions sense rec\u00f3rrer a la imatge d’uns paquets que es belluguen d’un costat a l’altre. A matem\u00e0tica es va veure la import\u00e0ncia de poder tractar problemes abstractes com podrien ser les propietats de les funcions o vectors en termes d’espai i de m\u00e8trica, de manera que hi poguem aplicar tota la intu\u00efci\u00f3 [esquema H1XXX] que tenim en aquest terreny.<\/p>\n
Si anem fent enrera buscant qu\u00e8 \u00e9s el m\u00e9s elemental, la mena de met\u00e0fora a la qual recorrem, trobem:<\/p>\n
– Met\u00e0fores de moviment (concebir situaci\u00f3 i canvi de les parts en termes de moviments en l’espai): “Els jocs van cap AMUNT”.
\n– Met\u00e0fores de container (situar les parts respecte d’un domini): “Qu\u00e8 fas FORA de la feina?”
\n– Met\u00e0fores ontol\u00f2giques (concepci\u00f3 d’una entitat abstracte com a una subst\u00e0ncia, un objecte f\u00edsic): “teoria ben constru\u00efda”, “Em surt fum del cap de tant pensar”, “El seu cervell funciona b\u00e9”.
\n– Met\u00e0fores de personificaci\u00f3 (entendre experi\u00e8ncies d’objectes en termes d’activitat humana): “Aquesta sequera ens far\u00e0 la guitza”.<\/p>\n
La majoria d’aquestes met\u00e0fores es basen en identitats estructurals ja establertes. Quan el poeta fa met\u00e0fores, no est\u00e0 ornamentant sin\u00f3 fent recerca de nous aspectes, creant nous significats: “La vida \u00e9s un conte est\u00fapid explicat per un idiota”.<\/p>\n
D’altres met\u00e0fores no es basen tant en identitats estructurals com en les prioritats i valors vigents d’una societat: Antigament un home religi\u00f3s equivalia a “home de b\u00e9” mentre que ara vol dir “conservador”. Avui una activitat “per ordinador” indica modernitat i efic\u00e0cia. L’anunci de coca-cola light amb l’Elton John i Louis Armstrong intenta canviar “light -> m\u00e9s sa per\u00f2 sense sabor” per “light -> m\u00e9s sa amb m\u00e9s vida i m\u00e9s marxa”. (Veure creences culturals CXXXX, SXXXX).<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Metaphors we live by, 1980 El nostre sistema conceptual es basa en la met\u00e0fora [les met\u00e0fores funcionen perqu\u00e8 estan arrelades en la nostra experi\u00e8ncia, com a cossos en l’espai, com a subjectes de relacions socials; despr\u00e9s ho traslladem Cassos: met\u00e0fores d’orientaci\u00f3, subst\u00e0ncia. Nous significats Epistemologia, objectivisme, subjectivisme, experiencialisme La import\u00e0ncia de les met\u00e0fores amb qu\u00e8 … <\/p>\n
Continue reading “Metaphors we live by. Lakoff & Johnson”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[603],"tags":[405,499],"anotacio":[],"civilitzacio":[],"spec":[],"aspecies":[],"Tema poesia":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"http:\/\/meumon.synology.me\/museu\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1967"}],"collection":[{"href":"http:\/\/meumon.synology.me\/museu\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"http:\/\/meumon.synology.me\/museu\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/meumon.synology.me\/museu\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/meumon.synology.me\/museu\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1967"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"http:\/\/meumon.synology.me\/museu\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1967\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"http:\/\/meumon.synology.me\/museu\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1967"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/meumon.synology.me\/museu\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1967"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/meumon.synology.me\/museu\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1967"},{"taxonomy":"anotacio","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/meumon.synology.me\/museu\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/anotacio?post=1967"},{"taxonomy":"civilitzacio","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/meumon.synology.me\/museu\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/civilitzacio?post=1967"},{"taxonomy":"spec","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/meumon.synology.me\/museu\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/spec?post=1967"},{"taxonomy":"aspecies","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/meumon.synology.me\/museu\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/aspecies?post=1967"},{"taxonomy":"Tema poesia","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/meumon.synology.me\/museu\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/Tema poesia?post=1967"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}