{"id":3642,"date":"2025-10-30T09:36:04","date_gmt":"2025-10-30T09:36:04","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/meumon.synology.me\/museu\/?p=3642"},"modified":"2026-03-16T09:33:51","modified_gmt":"2026-03-16T09:33:51","slug":"nivells-de-complexitat-i-emergencia-de-propietats","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/meumon.synology.me\/museu\/nivells-de-complexitat-i-emergencia-de-propietats\/","title":{"rendered":"Nivells de complexitat i emerg\u00e8ncia de propietats"},"content":{"rendered":"<ul>\n<li>Schr\u00f6dinger, la vida com uns cristalls no peri\u00f2dics<\/li>\n<li>Gestalt i Percepci\u00f3 de propietats superiors com la melodia<\/li>\n<li>An\u00e0lisi de diferents nivells de sistema a Layered Ontology<\/li>\n<li>2025 Gazzaniga i emerg\u00e8ncia de propietats, causalitat Top-Down<\/li>\n<li>Psicologia social: una societat suposa una emerg\u00e8ncia amb nous invariants<\/li>\n<li>El &#8220;jo&#8221; i &#8220;D\u00e9u&#8221; com a entitats emergents<\/li>\n<li>Complement a fisicalisme no reduccionista<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<hr \/>\n<p>Schr\u00f6dinger, Cristalls no peri\u00f2dics<\/p>\n<p>[2023 Abans ten\u00edem l&#8217;escala dels \u00e9ssers, inanimat, animals, home. Ara diem que ho redu\u00efm tot a f\u00edsica per\u00f2 tenim sistemes f\u00edsics molt diferents: sistemes uniformes, sistemes vida: creaci\u00f3 i reconstrucci\u00f3 de la complexitat (<a href=\"http:\/\/meumon.synology.me\/museu\/schrodinger-what-is-life\/\">Schr\u00f6dinger<\/a>, cristalls no peri\u00f2dics) sistemes amb consci\u00e8ncia i llenguatge. causalitat basada en la imaginaci\u00f3]<\/p>\n<hr \/>\n<p>[2024. La psicologia de la Gestalt va fer notar que identifiquem una melodia encara que la transposem -i en diferents arranjaments, ritmes, i timbres-, un altres exemple d&#8217;invariant i de fisicalisme no reduccionista].<\/p>\n<hr \/>\n<p>[2025. Complement an\u00e0lisi sistemes amb nivells de psicologia i la possibilitat de causalitat top-down:<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"http:\/\/meumon.synology.me\/ephemeracat\/taula\/filosofia\/layered-ontology-laplaces-demon-upgrades\/\">Layered Ontology<\/a><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>sistema simple: massa, c\u00e0rrega, l&#8217;energia quantitat de moviment<\/li>\n<li>sistema amb energia pr\u00f2pia, pila carregada, podem engegar o apagar, girar (roomba) + activaci\u00f3 en funci\u00f3 de senyals i informaci\u00f3<\/li>\n<li>l&#8217;evoluci\u00f3 du a sistemes orientats a &#8220;mantenir la complexitat&#8221; propagant els gens.<\/li>\n<li>l&#8217;evoluci\u00f3 adquireix la transmissi\u00f3 de conducta (her\u00e8ncia d&#8217;instints) i aprenentatge.<\/li>\n<li>2025<br \/>\namb els humans apareix, el llenguatge, transmissi\u00f3 cultural, la consci\u00e8ncia i la narraci\u00f3. La propagaci\u00f3 dels gens ara s&#8217;ajuda de la propagaci\u00f3 dels mems, la propagaci\u00f3 de la comunitat en la hist\u00f2ria, i la propagaci\u00f3 de la narraci\u00f3 personal. La narraci\u00f3 ens impulsa a sobreviure per\u00f2 un cop hem aconseguit so\u00a1breviure i cap als 35, passar la torxa de la vida a una altra generaci\u00f3, aquesta &#8220;eina&#8221; es troba una mica perduda perqu\u00e8 seguim vivint sense saber molt b\u00e9 per a qu\u00e8, hem de servir l&#8217;esp\u00e8cie? la comunitat? les nostres sensacions de benestar? la nostra coher\u00e8ncia narrativa?<\/li>\n<li>Veure <a href=\"http:\/\/meumon.synology.me\/museu\/psicologia-social\/#biaixos\">Cognici\u00f3 social i biaixos<\/a> per una discussi\u00f3 de com l&#8217;experiment de Libet que el sistema autom\u00e0tic ha actuat abans que en siguem conscients es limita a tasques simples, i que realment podem actuar per valors i projectes.<br \/>\n<hr \/>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h2>2025 Gazzaniga, emerg\u00e8ncia de propietats i causalitat top-down<\/h2>\n<p><strong>L&#8217;int\u00e8rpret i l&#8217;experi\u00e8ncia de jo agent<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>[D&#8217;una banda l&#8217;int\u00e8rpret de l&#8217;hemisferi esquerre del cervell ens proporciona una experi\u00e8ncia de narraci\u00f3 conscient en la que prenem decisions (<a href=\"http:\/\/meumon.synology.me\/museu\/el-jo-invariants-i-continuitat\/\">jo invariants<\/a>). De l&#8217;altra, sabem que la consci\u00e8ncia apareix despr\u00e9s que hagin tingut lloc tot de processos autom\u00e0tics inconscients. \u00c9s un epifenomen que no compta per a res?]<br \/>\nFrom what we learned in the last chapter, however, the modern perspective is that brains enable minds, and that YOU is your vastly parallel and distributed brain without a central command center. There is no ghost in the machine, no secret stuff that is YOU. That YOU that you are so proud of is a story woven together by your interpreter module to account for as much of your behavior as it can incorporate, and it denies or rationalizes the rest.<br \/>\n\/\/If the universe and everything in it are following predetermined laws, then that seems to imply that individuals are not personally responsible for their actions. Go ahead and eat the Death by Chocolate cake, it was preordained about two billion years ago. Cheat on the test? You have no control over that\u2014go ahead. Not getting along with your husband? Slip him some poison and say the universe made you do it. This is what caused such a stir when Newton presented his universal laws. I call this the Bleak View, but many scientists and determinists think this is the way things are. The rest of us just don\u2019t believe it. \u201cThe universe made me buy that dress!\u201d or \u201cThe universe made me buy that Boxster!\u201d* just isn\u2019t going to fly well at the dinner table. If we were to be logical neuroscientists, however, shouldn\u2019t it? A Post Hoc World? We accept the idea that our bodies are humming along, being run by automatic systems that follow deterministic laws. Luckily, we don\u2019t have to consciously digest our food, keep our heart beating, and our lungs oxygenating.<br \/>\n[Hawking deia que fins i tot els m\u00e9s creients en el determinisme miraven abans de travessar el carrer]<\/p>\n<p><strong>Lliure albir<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>[No volem ser marionetes manipulades de fora o per un rellotge interior que obri l&#8217;aixeta de neurotransmissors, per\u00f2 alhora volem determinisme i causalitat, justament ser lliure voldria dir &#8220;causar&#8221; estats de coses amb les accions resultat de les nostres eleccions]<br \/>\nwhat does it really mean to talk about free will? \u201cAh, well, we want to be free to make our own decisions.\u201d Yes, but what do we want to be free from? We don\u2019t want to be free from our experience of life, we need that for our decisions. We don\u2019t want to be free from our temperament because that also guides our decisions. We actually don\u2019t want to be free from causation, we use that for predictions.<\/p>\n<p><strong>[la q\u00fcesti\u00f3 doncs \u00e9s: &#8220;els estats mentals que emergeixen, la narraci\u00f3, el projecte de vida, \u00e9s rellevant? introdueix un nou tipus de causalitat? o b\u00e9 \u00e9s un epifenomen de les aixetes de neurotransmissors?]<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>&#8220;Mental states such as beliefs, thoughts, and desires all arise from brain activity and in turn can and do influence our decisions to act one way or another. Ultimately, these interactions will only be understood with a new vocabulary that captures the fact that two different layers of stuff are interacting in such a way that existing alone animates neither. As John Doyle at Caltech puts the issue, \u201c[T]he standard problem is illustrated with hardware and software; software depends on hardware to work, but is also in some sense more \u2018fundamental\u2019 in that it is what delivers function. So what causes what? Nothing is mysterious here, but using the language of \u2018cause\u2019 seems to muddle it. We should probably come up with new and appropriate language rather than try to get into some Aristotelian categories.\u201d Understanding this nexus and finding the right language to describe it represents, as Doyle says, \u201cthe hardest and most unique problem in science.\u201d<\/p>\n<p><strong>Determinisme i l\u00edmits, teoria del caos, mec\u00e0nica qu\u00e0ntica<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Les equacions de la mec\u00e0nica s\u00f3n deterministes per\u00f2 com que no podem mesurar les condicions inicials amb infinita precisi\u00f3, tenim sistemes en que una petita desviaci\u00f3 no altera el decurs de les coses per\u00f2 en d&#8217;altres, s\u00ed, de manera que el sistema \u00e9s ca\u00f2tic. (Poincar\u00e9 i els N-cossos (o tres), i Lorenz i la predicci\u00f3 del temps).<br \/>\n[Per\u00f2 igual que passa amb la mec\u00e0nica qu\u00e0ntica, aquestes limitacions a la nostra capacitat de predicci\u00f3 no afectarien a la discussi\u00f3]<\/p>\n<p><strong>Sistemes irreversibles lluny de l&#8217;equilibri i emerg\u00e8ncia<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Prigogine va estudiar els sistemes irreversibles que dissipaven energia i que duien a noves propietats quan estaven lluny de l&#8217;equilibri .<br \/>\n&#8220;The smart aleck brings up the topic of <strong>emergence<\/strong>. Emergence is when micro-level complex systems that are far from equilibrium (thus allowing for the amplification of random events) self-organize (creative, self-generated, adaptability-seeking behavior) into new structures, with new properties that previously did not exist, to form a new level of organization on the macro level.16 There are two schools of thought on emergence. In weak emergence, the new properties arise as a result of the interactions at an elemental level and the emergent property is reducible to its individual components, that is, you can figure out the steps from one level to the next, which would be the deterministic view. Whereas, in strong emergence, the new property is irreducible, is more than the sum of its parts, and because of the amplification of random events, the laws cannot be predicted by an underlying fundamental theory or from an understanding of the laws of another level of organization.<\/p>\n<p>Ilya Prigogine, however, was happy about one thing. He could identify the \u201carrow of time\u201d as an emergent property that appears at a higher, macro, organizational level.<\/p>\n<p><strong>\u00c0toms i Newton<\/strong><br \/>\nNo podem predir el macro a partir del micro ni el micro a partir del macro. Per exemple, hi ha 11 tipus d&#8217;organitzaci\u00f3 d&#8217;aigua gla\u00e7, per\u00f2 no els sabr\u00edem anticipar.This is even true for something as basic as water turning to ice, as physicist Robert Laughlin has pointed out: Ice has so far been found to have eleven distinct crystalline phases, but none of them were predicted by first principles!17 The balls in my living room are made up of atoms that behave as described by quantum mechanics, and when those microscopic atoms come together to form macroscopic balls, a new behavior emerges and that behavior is what Newton observed and described. It turns out that Newton\u2019s laws aren\u2019t fundamental, they are emergent; that is, they are what happens when quantum matter aggregates into macroscopic fluids and objects. It is a collective organizational phenomenon. The thing is, you can\u2019t predict Newton\u2019s laws from observing the behavior of atoms, nor the behavior of atoms from Newton\u2019s laws.<\/p>\n<p><strong>neurones i estats mentals<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Quantum mechanics are the rules for atoms, Newton\u2019s laws are the rules for objects, and one couldn\u2019t completely predict the other. So the question is whether we can take what we know from the micro level of neurophysiology about neurons and neurotransmitters and come up with a determinist model to predict conscious thoughts, the outcomes of brains, or psychology.<\/p>\n<p>Can we derive the macro story from the micro story? I do not think so. I do not think that brain-state theorists, those neural reductionists who hold that every mental state is identical to some as-yet-undiscovered neural state, will ever be able to demonstrate.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Independ\u00e8ncia del suport, [hardware, software, realitzaci\u00f3 m\u00faltiple]<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>That doesn\u2019t explain it; it simply recognizes its reality or level of abstraction, like what happens when software and hardware interact, that mind is a somewhat independent property of brain while simultaneously being wholly dependent upon it.<\/p>\n<p>Estudiant una llagosta s&#8217;ha vist per l&#8217;acci\u00f3 de moure&#8217;s hi huaria fins a 10<sup>5<\/sup> configuracions diferents compatibles [el mateix text en milers de tipus de lletra i colors diferents]<\/p>\n<p>Reductionism in the physical sciences has been challenged by the principle of emergence. The whole system acquires qualitatively new properties that cannot be predicted from the simple addition of those of its individual components.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Emerg\u00e8ncia de propietats en el grup<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Estudiant els motors dels cotxes no podr\u00edem predir els moviments de gent ni els embussos. Estudiant neurones no haur\u00edem pogut predir el tango.<\/p>\n<p>I think that we neuroscientists are looking at these capacities from the wrong organizational level. We are looking at them from the individual brain level, but they are emergent properties found in the group interactions of many brains.<\/p>\n<p>[En filosofia de la ment jo havia notat que sovint assimil\u00e0vem la ment a un ordinador a\u00efllat que modifica el seu software a partir de la interacci\u00f3 amb el m\u00f3n (c\u00e0mera de v\u00eddeo, perif\u00e8rics). Per\u00f2 a la feina era evident que els ordinadors estaven en xarxa i rebien dels servidors de la xarxa el seu software. I els servidors es modificaven des d&#8217;un ordinador particular!]<\/p>\n<p><strong>Anderson,. More is different<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Premi Nobel de F\u00edsica d&#8217;estat s\u00f2lid assenyala que les propietats de conjunt grossos de part\u00edcules no es poden deduir de les propietats de les part\u00edcules elementals. En concret, aquestes presenten una simetria que els conjunts grossos han trencat.<br \/>\nLa idea \u00e9s que a mesura que creix el nombre de part\u00edcules, la mat\u00e8ria &#8220;will undergo mathematically sharp, singular &#8216;phase transitions&#8217; to states in which the microscopic symmetries, and even the micorscopic equations of motion, are in a sense violated&#8230;. In this case we can see how the whole becomes not only more than but very different from the sum of its parts.<\/p>\n<p><strong>La F\u00edsica, l&#8217;estudi de l&#8217;organitzaci\u00f3<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>&#8220;At some point we have to stop talking about decreasing symmetry and sart calling it increasing complication&#8221;<br \/>\nA&#8221; Different Universe&#8221;, Robert Laughlin, who won the Nobel Prize in Physics in 1998, said about the dawning of the understanding of emergence, \u201cWhat we are seeing is a transformation of worldview in which the objective of understanding nature by breaking it down into ever smaller parts is supplanted by the objective of understanding how nature organizes itself.<\/p>\n<p>[Per\u00f2 no haur\u00edem pogut plantejar l&#8217;estudi de l&#8217;organitzaci\u00f3 sense abans haver desmuntat el rellotge]<\/p>\n<p><strong>llibertat i responsabilitat<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>The same holds true for brains. Brains are automatic machines following decision pathways, but analyzing single brains in isolation cannot illuminate the capacity of responsibility. Responsibility is a dimension of life that comes from social exchange, and social exchange requires more than one brain. When more than one brain interacts, new and unpredictable things begin to emerge, establishing a new set of rules.<\/p>\n<p>[i estudiant com es disparen neurones tampoc podr\u00edem donar ra\u00f3 de la vida narrativa]<\/p>\n<p><strong>Un estat mental M1 en pot causar un altre M2 o s\u00f3n sensacions que acompanyen els fets del cervell? (epifenomen)<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>There is a physical state, P1, at time 1, which produces a mental state, M1. Then after a bit of time, now time 2, there is another physical state, P2, which produces another mental state, M2. How do we get from M1 to M2? This is the conundrum. We know that mental states are produced from processes in the brain so that M1 does not directly generate M2 without involving the brain. If we just go from P1 to P2 then to M2, then our mental life is doing no work and we are truly just along for the ride. No one really likes that notion. The tough question is, does M1, in some downward-constraining process, guide P2, thus affecting M2?<\/p>\n<p>Hi hauria una causalitat doble.<br \/>\nHoward Pattee, finds that a good example of upward and downward causation is the genotype-phenotype mapping of description to construction. It \u201crequires the gene to describe the sequence of parts forming enzymes, and that description, in turn, requires the enzymes to read the description. .\u00a0.\u00a0. In its simplest logical form, the parts represented by symbols (codons) are, in part, controlling the construction of the whole (enzymes), but the whole is, in part, controlling the identification of the parts (translation) and the construction itself (protein synthesis).\u201d<\/p>\n<p>[un d\u00e8ficit de neuro transmissors pot causar un estat de tristesa. L&#8217;estat mental de percebre la vida sense sentit pot influir els neurotransmissors]<\/p>\n<hr \/>\n<p>Psicologia social\u00a0 <a href=\"http:\/\/meumon.synology.me\/museu\/psicologia-social\/#discussio\">4 tipus de fet<\/a>: un &#8220;organisme&#8221; amb &#8220;DNA&#8221; cultural, invariants de territori, creences, activitats de la societat.<\/p>\n<hr \/>\n<p>Emerg\u00e8ncia del &#8220;jo&#8221; i de &#8220;D\u00e9u&#8221;, filosofia &#8220;COM SI&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>En un estol d&#8217;ocells sembla que hi hagi alg\u00fa que el dirigeix, per\u00f2 \u00e9s una propietat emergent. En els models de llenguatge artificials, o en l&#8217;adquisici\u00f3 de llenguatge per part dels nens sembla que hi hagin definides unes regles per\u00f2 en realitat s\u00f3n impl\u00edcites. Tamb\u00e9 sembla com si els LLM tinguessin darrere un model del m\u00f3n.<\/p>\n<p>I si aix\u00f2 es pogu\u00e9s aplicar a les categories de &#8220;JO&#8221; i &#8220;D\u00c9U&#8221;? En l&#8217;home tenim el seguit d&#8217;estats de consci\u00e8ncia que poden ser fragmentaris, tenim tamb\u00e9 una autonarraci\u00f3 en curs, que es va corregint sobre la marxa -com<a href=\"http:\/\/meumon.synology.me\/museu\/el-vaixell-de-teseu\/\"> un vaixell de Teseu<\/a>. Podem especular que la continu\u00eftat narrativa o que en el seguit d&#8217;estats de consci\u00e8ncia hi siguin presents un passat i un futur projectat, \u00e9s COM SI darrere hi hagu\u00e9s un jo substancial, encara que no hi sigui. I el que \u00e9s important, aquesta narraci\u00f3 influeix el funcionament del conjunt cervell-organisme, segons si ens sembla una narraci\u00f3 amb sentit i projectada, o absurda. La condici\u00f3 humana, de seguit de processos de cos i cervell, seguit d&#8217;experi\u00e8ncies, a protagonista d&#8217;una narraci\u00f3. De la motivaci\u00f3 elemental de gana i set, a somiar, voler ser acceptat i voler-se autorealitzar. Del sistema pel qual \u00e9s est\u00edmuls que compten s\u00f3n senyals externs, a un sistema que t\u00e9 un projecte i soluciona problemes; arriba un moment en que l&#8217;est\u00edmul \u00e9s interior. (<a href=\"http:\/\/meumon.synology.me\/museu\/antropologia-en-literatura-i-biografia\/#biografia\">Antropologia en la literatura i la biografia<\/a>).<\/p>\n<p>I podem especular el mateix amb D\u00e9u, l&#8217;experi\u00e8ncia de la immensitat de l&#8217;univers, la diversitat i complexitat de la vida, que hi existeixi aquesta complexitat tan improbable en lloc d&#8217;un gas uniforme, ens pot suggerir que \u00e9s l&#8217;obra d&#8217;alg\u00fa trascendent i voldr\u00edem que aquest alg\u00fa intervingu\u00e9s en el patiment i f\u00e9s just\u00edcia. Ens pot semblar que l&#8217;univers funciona COM SI exist\u00eds darrere un D\u00e9u. Aix\u00f2 sempre amb la tensi\u00f3 que no aparegui mai expl\u00edcitament, i que sembli indiferent al patiment. En aquest cas seria com l&#8217;estol d&#8217;ocells, ens sembla que hi ha alg\u00fa que dirigeixi, per\u00f2 no hi \u00e9s.<\/p>\n<hr \/>\n<p>2026 Fisicalisme no reduccionista<\/p>\n<p>A <a href=\"http:\/\/meumon.synology.me\/ephemeracat\/taula\/filosofia\/layered-ontology-laplaces-demon-upgrades\/\">Layered Ontology<\/a> posava l&#8217;exemple de l&#8217;escala OSI de telecomunicacions com a cas que el fisicalisme no implicava que les estructures d&#8217;alt nivell fossin epifen\u00f2mens. [Com si tot fos un gran joc de billar i si a vegades le sboles semblen formar patrons, no volen dir res].<\/p>\n<p>M\u00e9s exemples:<\/p>\n<p>[Reduccionisme vol dir que no hi ha cap canvi a nivell mental sense un canvi a nivell f\u00edsic. Per\u00f2 a mesura que els sistemes es tornen m\u00e9s complexes apareix una causalitat d&#8217;alt nivell que fins un cert punt \u00e9s independent del nivell f\u00edsic que hi ha per sota. Per exemple, si envio un missatge d&#8217;amor o una declaraci\u00f3 de guerra, ho puc fer verbalment, per carta en paper, per correu electr\u00f2nic. D&#8217;una banda canviar el missatge implica canviar el que passa a nivell f\u00edsic, les ones sonores, els signes sobre el paper, els 0,1 dels senyals transmesos per l&#8217;ordinador. Per\u00f2 al mateix temps, els efectes del missatge no s&#8217;expliquen per la f\u00edsica subjacent, sin\u00f3 per la vida de l&#8217;emissor i receptor del missatge. Un canvi molt petit en la &#8220;f\u00edsica&#8221; subjacent, per exemple una lletra, pot imnplicar una gran difer\u00e8ncia a nivell macro. I a l&#8217;inrev\u00e9s, canvis enormes en la f\u00edsica subjacent, ones sonores, pixels a una pantalla, tinta sobre un paper, tenen el mateix resultat. \u00c9s una mica el que ja havia descobert la psicologia de la Gestalt amb la percepci\u00f3. Identifiquem una melodia encara que s&#8217;interpreti amb diferents instruments i diferent tonalitat (una f\u00edsica diferent), perqu\u00e8 del que es tracta \u00e9s de les relacions entre les notes i no le snotes mateixes. Podem recon\u00e8ixer el rostre de Marilyn Monroe en una fotoo en un quadre d&#8217;Andy Warhol.<br \/>\nDit d&#8217;altra manera, alg\u00fa que nom\u00e9s miri la f\u00edsica a baix nivell, no pot explicar els efectes del missatge. O per exemple, alg\u00fa que conegui tots els moviments possibles del cos hum\u00e0, no pot predir els passos del tango].<\/p>\n<p>O b\u00e9 un joc d&#8217;escacs: el material de les peces, la seva mida, no importa gens. Hi poden haver grans canvis en la f\u00edsica subjacent que no afecten per a res al que trobem rellevant per descriure qu\u00e8 est\u00e0 passant. Cap comentarista d&#8217;una partida ens parlar\u00e0 del pes de les peces.<\/p>\n<p>&#8211;.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Schr\u00f6dinger, la vida com uns cristalls no peri\u00f2dics Gestalt i Percepci\u00f3 de propietats superiors com la melodia An\u00e0lisi de diferents nivells de sistema a Layered Ontology 2025 Gazzaniga i emerg\u00e8ncia de propietats, causalitat Top-Down Psicologia social: una societat suposa una emerg\u00e8ncia amb nous invariants El &#8220;jo&#8221; i &#8220;D\u00e9u&#8221; com a entitats emergents Complement a fisicalisme &hellip; <\/p>\n<p class=\"link-more\"><a href=\"http:\/\/meumon.synology.me\/museu\/nivells-de-complexitat-i-emergencia-de-propietats\/\" class=\"more-link\">Continue reading<span class=\"screen-reader-text\"> &#8220;Nivells de complexitat i emerg\u00e8ncia de propietats&#8221;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[102],"tags":[127,91],"anotacio":[],"civilitzacio":[],"spec":[],"aspecies":[],"Tema poesia":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"http:\/\/meumon.synology.me\/museu\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3642"}],"collection":[{"href":"http:\/\/meumon.synology.me\/museu\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"http:\/\/meumon.synology.me\/museu\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/meumon.synology.me\/museu\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/meumon.synology.me\/museu\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3642"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"http:\/\/meumon.synology.me\/museu\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3642\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"http:\/\/meumon.synology.me\/museu\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3642"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/meumon.synology.me\/museu\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3642"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/meumon.synology.me\/museu\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3642"},{"taxonomy":"anotacio","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/meumon.synology.me\/museu\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/anotacio?post=3642"},{"taxonomy":"civilitzacio","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/meumon.synology.me\/museu\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/civilitzacio?post=3642"},{"taxonomy":"spec","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/meumon.synology.me\/museu\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/spec?post=3642"},{"taxonomy":"aspecies","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/meumon.synology.me\/museu\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/aspecies?post=3642"},{"taxonomy":"Tema poesia","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/meumon.synology.me\/museu\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/Tema poesia?post=3642"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}