fake news
11/03/2018
FAKE NEWS
com saber les dades que google facebook i altres companyies tenen sobre nosaltres mateixos.
The platform’s most popular classes include:
KHAN Academy, Duolingo al mòbil,
Drops per idiomes
slowly per escriure cartes
2019
NEW YORKER SOCIAL MEDIA
This weekend—after a horrific mass shooting in New Zealand was live-streamed on Facebook—we’re bringing you a selection of pieces about the ways in which social media is affecting our lives and our politics. In “
Ghost in the Machine,” Evan Osnos investigates Facebook’s impact on the 2016 Presidential election and assesses the social network’s efforts to balance freedom of expression with content moderation; in “
Antisocial Media,” Andrew Marantz chronicles Reddit’s attempt to fight hate speech. Adrian Chen traces the journey of Megan Phelps-Roper, the granddaughter of the founder of the Westboro Baptist Church, as she becomes more active on social media and eventually transforms from a faithful adherent into a skeptic, in “
Unfollow.” Ariel Levy visits Ohio and examines the role of online vigilantism in a rape case in the town of Steubenville, in “
Trial by Twitter.” In “
Beauty Is Justice,” Jiayang Fan describes how the selfie phenomenon and innovative photo-editing apps are changing the ways in which people perceive individuality and beauty in China and across the globe. Finally, in “
Man and Machine,” Susan Orlean delves into the surreal world of the Twitter account Horse_ebooks and its experimental approach to Internet art. At a time when social media is transforming seemingly every aspect of society, these pieces take its measure.
Watching the bitcoin phenomenon is a bit like watching the three-decade decline of the internet from a playspace for the counterculture to one for venture capitalists. We thought the net would break the monopoly of top-down, corporate media. But as business interests took over it has become primarily a delivery system for streaming television to consumers, and consumer data to advertisers. Likewise, bitcoin was intended to break the monopoly of the banking system over central currency and credit. But, in the end, it will turn into just another platform for the big banks to do the same old extraction they always have.
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/12/16/the-kremlins-creative-director les notícies sobre Putin, no existeix el real. Baldly false stories, in the right doses, are not disastrous for Channel One; in fact, they are an integral part of the Putin system’s postmodern approach to propaganda. In the Soviet era, the state pushed a coherent, if occasionally clumsy, narrative to convince the public of the official version of events. But private media ownership and widespread Internet access have made this impossible. Today, state outlets tell viewers what they are already inclined to believe, rather than try to convince them of what they can plainly see is untrue. At the same time, they release a cacophony of theories with the aim of nudging viewers toward believing nothing at all, or of making them so overwhelmed that they simply throw up their hands. Trying to ascertain the truth becomes a matter of guessing who benefits from a given narrative. // “I grew up and travelled all over, and, especially in recent years, it’s become increasingly clear to me that justice, democracy, the complete truth—they don’t exist anywhere in the world,” he said. Ernst wears his cynicism as a sign of enlightenment. It would be impossible to convince him that today’s CNN and the BBC don’t have the same partiality as Channel One, or are not also following an agenda. “People who make television are citizens of a specific country, from a certain nationality, with particular cultural codes,” Ernst told me. Channel One must play the game the way everyone else does.
https://getpocket.com/explore/item/invisible-manipulators-of-your-mind aplicant la recerca de Kahneman que no prenem decisions racionalment sinó que depenen dels nostres prejudicis. Cambridge analytic ava fer guanyar Trump i el Brexit: In describing their “behavioral” methods of persuasion, Nix gives the example of a private beach owner who wishes to keep the public out. He might, Nix says, put up an “informational” sign that seeks to inform attitudes, such as: “Public beach ends here: private property.” Or he could seek “to probe an altogether much more powerful, underlying motivation” by putting up a sign that says “Warning: shark sighted.” The threat of being eaten by a shark, Nix claims, will be more effective. Similarly, in videos made by Cambridge Analytica’s research wing, the Behavioral Dynamics Institute, the group describes strategies for appealing directly to people’s underlying fears and desires in ways that are continuous with the insights of behavioral economics, but that seem less scrupulous about employing lies or half-truths to influence System One motivations.
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/05/11/how-we-got-to-sesame-streetAbroad, “Sesame Street” is still driven by the spirit of 1968. In the U.S., that spark has gone. The Muppets were sold to Disney, after which the Disney Channel launched a sickening remake of the Henson series “Muppet Babies,” a show so merchandise-driven that wittle, itty-bitty, never-witty Baby Kermit might as well talk with a price tag hanging off his face. Since 2015, “Sesame Street” has been released first not on PBS but on HBO. A show designed as a public service, part of the War on Poverty, is now one you’ve got to pay for. In a staggering betrayal of the spirit of the show’s founding philosophy, last year’s fiftieth-anniversary special appeared on HBO before it was broadcast on PBS.
ttps://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/04/26/the-incredible-rise-of-north-koreas-hacking-army Nord Corea formant hackers per robar diners
manipular els somnis
Tech giants such as Amazon, Apple and Google have all developed smart devices designed to monitor people’s sleep (eg, Amazon’s upcoming radar sensor, Apple’s iPhone and Apple Watch, Google’s Fitbit and Nest Hub). While these technologies and the data they collect are ostensibly geared to improve people’s sleep, it is not hard to envision a world in which our phones and smart speakers – now widely present in people’s bedrooms – become instruments of overnight advertising, or data collection, with or without our knowledge.
Even if we willingly give permission for the collection of our sleep data, it could be difficult to fully understand what will be done with it. Imagine this data being sold to corporations selling sleep aids, so that, after a particularly restless night, the ads that appear during your internet searches are for Benadryl, Ambien or Tylenol PM, even though you might not remember how poorly you slept. Since sleep loss is known to increase risk-taking behaviour, one might expect to be hit with targeted ads for online gambling. As there is evidence linking sleep loss to sugar intake as well, ads for candy might pop up.
Alguns diuen que el social media, el retweet o el like de FB el 2010 va ser com deixar una pistola a l’absta d’un nen de 4 anys. Però estudis mostren que els social media en realitat no distorsionen tant les coses, sinó que confirmen el que ja som.[el que odia, ja odiava]
There’s a strange irony to all of this. For years, researchers, technologists, politicians, and journalists have agonized and cautioned against the wildness of the internet and its penchant for amplifying conspiracy theories, divisive subject matter, and flat-out false information. Many people, myself included, have argued for platforms to surface quality, authoritative information above all else, even at the expense of profit. And it’s possible that Google has, in some sense, listened (albeit after far too much inaction) and, maybe, partly succeeded in showing higher-quality results in a number of contentious categories. But instead of ushering in an era of perfect information, the changes might be behind the complainers’ sense that Google Search has stopped delivering interesting results. In theory, we crave authoritative information, but authoritative information can be dry and boring. It reads more like a government form or a textbook than a novel. The internet that many people know and love is the opposite—it is messy, chaotic, unpredictable. It is exhausting, unending, and always a little bit dangerous. It is profoundly human.
But it’s worth remembering what that humanity looked like inside search results. Rand Fishkin, the founder of the software company SparkToro, who has been writing and thinking about search since 2004, believes that Google has gotten better at not amplifying conspiracy theories and hate speech, but that it took the company far too long. “I don’t know if you searched for holocaust information between 2000 and 2008, but deniers routinely showed up in the top results,” he told me. The same was true for Sandy Hook hoaxers—in fact, campaigns from the Sandy Hook families to fight the conspiracy theories led to some of the search engine’s changes. “Whenever somebody says, ‘Hey, Google doesn’t feel as human anymore,’ all I can say is that I bet they don’t want a return to that,” Fishkin said.
compro el que vull? o el que un algoritme ha decidit presentar-me a tiktok? It can feel as though every app is trying to guess what you want before your brain has time to come up with its own answer, like an obnoxious party guest who finishes your sentences as you speak them. [ el pitjor és que els algoritmes són com una caixa fosca i no sabem ben bé com funcionen] Jhaver came to see the Airbnb hosts as workers being overseen by a computer overlord instead of human managers. In order to make a living, they had to guess what their capricious boss wanted, and the anxious guesswork may have made the system less efficient over all.
teoria conspirativa segons la qual els governs escampen vacunes i substàncies per controlar la ment
la campanya per desacreditar el perill del canvi climàtic
https://bereal.com/en cada dia avisa a l’atzar de fer una selfie i foto del voltant a compartir amb els amics
Multiverse.
diferents universos posibles, el jadí dels camins que es bifurquen de Borges, avui es concreta en el multiverse. There’s a reason that studios plan to spend billions of dollars—more than the economic output of some countries—to mass-produce more of the multiverse: tens of millions of people will spend time and money consuming it. Is the rise of the multiverse the death of originality? Did our culture take the wrong forking path? Or has the multiverse unlocked a kind of storytelling—familiar but flexible, entrancing but evolving—that we genuinely need?
Just a handful of companies—Disney (which owns Marvel Entertainment and Lucasfilm), Warner Bros. Discovery (which owns DC Films), Sony Pictures, Paramount Global—now hold the rights to the fictional people who stride across our screens. Watching their pulse-pounding prequels and sequels can itself feel like running on a cosmic treadmill: because corporate owners tend to resist change, heroes often end up right where they started (and we get a “new” Spider-Man movie every few years). Multiverses seem to make it easier for big companies to create new-yet-old heroes. No wonder cinephiles have had enough.
Why do we live in a multiversal moment? One theory holds that the ascent of the multiverse matches our need to keep up many identities. We may feel like different people as we slide from Instagram to Slack to the family group chat; we code-switch as we move between work and home and parent-teacher conferences. Victorians might have been wowed by the two-faced Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, this theory goes, but nowadays we require something stronger—hence a TV show like “Loki,” whose titular antihero has numerous manifestations, including a man, a woman, a child, an alligator, and a President. Every time I try to answer questions from both my kids at the same time, without burning their cinnamon toast or showing up late to a Zoom call with my students, I think there must be something to this hypothesis.
[identitats diferents, nota sota la fragilitat del jo narratiu]
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2022/12/openai-chatgpt-writing-high-school-english-essay/672412/ chat open ai escriu sobre qualsevol cosa https://chat.openai.com/
I think that this incident with the Xerox photocopier is worth bearing in mind today, as we consider OpenAI’s ChatGPT and other similar programs, which A.I. researchers call large-language models. The resemblance between a photocopier and a large-language model might not be immediately apparent—but consider the following scenario. Imagine that you’re about to lose your access to the Internet forever. In preparation, you plan to create a compressed copy of all the text on the Web, so that you can store it on a private server. Unfortunately, your private server has only one per cent of the space needed; you can’t use a lossless compression algorithm if you want everything to fit. Instead, you write a lossy algorithm that identifies statistical regularities in the text and stores them in a specialized file format. Because you have virtually unlimited computational power to throw at this task, your algorithm can identify extraordinarily nuanced statistical regularities, and this allows you to achieve the desired compression ratio of a hundred to one.
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2023/02/06/when-americans-lost-faith-in-the-news
Back in 1976, even after Vietnam and Watergate, seventy-two per cent of the public said they trusted the news media. Today, the figure is thirty-four per cent. Among Republicans, it’s fourteen per cent. If “Democracy Dies in Darkness” seemed a little alarmist in 2017, the storming of the Capitol on January 6, 2021, made it seem prescient. Democracy really was at stake.
The classic statement of the problem is Walter Lippmann’s book “Public Opinion,” published a hundred and one years ago. Lippmann’s critique remains relevant today—the Columbia Journalism School mounted a four-day conference on “Public Opinion” last fall, and people found that there was still plenty to talk about. Lippmann’s argument was that journalism is not a profession. You don’t need a license or an academic credential to practice the trade. All sorts of people call themselves journalists. Are all of them providing the public with reliable and disinterested news goods?
Julian Assange is possibly a criminal. He certainly intervened in the 2016 election, allegedly with Russian help, to damage the candidacy of Hillary Clinton. But top newspaper editors have insisted that what Assange does is protected by the First Amendment, and the Committee to Protect Journalists has protested the charges against him.
Lippmann had another point: journalism is not a public service; it’s a business. The most influential journalists today are employees of large corporations, and their work product is expected to be profitable. The notion that television news is, or ever was, a loss leader is a myth. In the nineteen-sixties, the nightly “Huntley-Brinkley Report” was NBC’s biggest money-maker. “60 Minutes,” which débuted on CBS in 1968, ranked among the top ten most watched shows on television for twenty-three years in a row.
[ Durant la guerra freda no deien el que sabien ]
Many members of the Washington press, including editors and publishers, had served in the government during the Second World War—in the Office of Strategic Services (the forerunner of the C.I.A.), in the Office of War Information, and in other capacities in Washington and London. They had been part of the war effort, and their sense of duty persisted after the war ended. Defending democracy was not just the government’s job. It was the press’s job, too.
Between 1945 and 1975, there was one woman in the Cabinet and one Black person. Each served for two years. On the press side, it was worse. Female and Black reporters were programmatically excluded. They had no entrée to certain press functions, and editors did not assign women to cover government affairs. Flat-out racism and sexism persisted much longer than seems believable today.
In 1977, Carl Bernstein published an article in Rolling Stone in which he claimed that more than four hundred journalists had worked clandestinely for the C.I.A. since 1952. Major news organizations—Bernstein said that the “most valuable” were the Times, CBS, and Time—gave credentials to C.I.A. agents to use as cover in foreign countries, sold outtakes from their reports to the agency, and allowed reporters to be debriefed by C.I.A. officials.
The story of the 1968 Convention—where Johnson’s Vice-President, Hubert Humphrey, won the nomination despite not having entered a single primary, and where the Party’s antiwar forces were defeated at almost every turn while police and the National Guard manhandled demonstrators and cameramen in the streets, and two correspondents, Dan Rather and Mike Wallace, were roughed up by security on the Convention floor—has been told many times.
The historian David Farber, in his book about the Convention, “Chicago ’68,” reports that only ten per cent of whites polled said they thought that Mayor Daley used too much force. Even among opponents of the war, more than seventy per cent reacted negatively to the protesters.
Still, it’s notable that Daley was able to pin all the blame on the press. Walter Cronkite and Chet Huntley were no radicals. They were much more outspoken about the way the media was treated at the Convention than about what happened to the demonstrators. “The networks generally operated with tremendous fairness in Chicago,” Hendershot writes, “and attacks after the fact were unwarranted.” Yet she believes that Chicago was “a tipping point for widespread distrust of the mainstream media.”
That loss of trust was taken advantage of by Republican politicians. They could see that demonizing the press was good politics. Richard Nixon, elected nine weeks after Chicago, went to war against the media.
The medium got the message. After Chicago, as Hodgson explains, coverage of political unrest, the civil-rights movement, and the war was vastly reduced. By the end of 1970, people had almost forgotten about Vietnam (although Americans continued to die there for five more years), partly because they were seeing and reading much less about it. The networks understood that most viewers did not want to see images of wounded soldiers or antiwar protesters or inner-city rioters. They also understood that the government held, as it always had, the regulatory hammer.
Vietnam was the beginning of our present condition of polarization, and one of the features of polarization is that there is no such thing as objectivity or impartiality anymore. In a polarized polity, either you’re with us or you’re against us. You can’t be disinterested, because everyone knows that disinterestedness is a façade. Viewers in 1968 didn’t want fair and balanced. They wanted the press to condemn kids with long hair giving cops the finger.
We are still there today. It is said that objectivity is what we need more of, but that’s not what people want. What people want is advocacy. The balance between belief and skepticism that Schudson described has tipped. It is understood now that everyone has an agenda, even Dr. Fauci. Especially Dr. Fauci, since he keeps talking about “science.”
Vietnam was the beginning of our present condition of polarization, and one of the features of polarization is that there is no such thing as objectivity or impartiality anymore. In a polarized polity, either you’re with us or you’re against us. You can’t be disinterested, because everyone knows that disinterestedness is a façade. Viewers in 1968 didn’t want fair and balanced. They wanted the press to condemn kids with long hair giving cops the finger.
We are still there today. It is said that objectivity is what we need more of, but that’s not what people want. What people want is advocacy. The balance between belief and skepticism that Schudson described has tipped. It is understood now that everyone has an agenda, even Dr. Fauci. Especially Dr. Fauci, since he keeps talking about “science.”
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-65019136 els partidaris de Trump no es manifestaran per la seva detenció víctimes de les seves pròpies teories conspiratives segons la qual els fets del 6 de gener de 2021 van ser instigats per l’FBI i l’esquerra antifa per culpar Trump.
Ja no sabem conversar i escoltar, només volem guanyar.
As the philosopher Michael Oakeshott observed, in conversation “there is no ‘truth’ to be discovered, no proposition to be proved, no conclusion sought.” What matters, he continued, is the “flow of speculation.” Conversation is casual; it isn’t a chat (too noncommittal), a debate (too contentious), or a colloquy (too academic). And yet the cachet of conversation, with its connotations of open-mindedness and open-endedness, also encourages an overly broad application.
Uses of the phrase “national conversation” soared during the Presidency of Barack Obama, America’s last great conversationalist-in-chief.
,“Good Arguments: How Debate Teaches Us to Listen and Be Heard” (Penguin Press), Bo Seo, a two-time world-champion debater, offers his own method for disagreeing with others. “An argument contains nearly infinite space for improvement,” he writes.
the journalist Anand Giridharadas laments a contemporary climate that is “confrontational and sensational and dismissive.” In the age of sophisticated psychographic profiling, strategists think that it’s rational for warring sides in a campaign to “write off” those who are unlikely to join their cause and instead focus on mobilizing their base.
2024
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2024/02/05/can-the-internet-be-governed internet, sense regulació acaba en mans privades. L’altre extrem són els governs cm Xina. Una nova possibilitat és la identitat digital que està desplegant la Índia.
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2024/04/08/so-you-think-youve-been-gaslit?utm_source=pocket_mylist
https://www.npr.org/2024/04/01/1240778608/anti-vaccine-activists-far-right-freedom-economy-gab-gabpay?utm_source=pocket_mylist
https://macleans.ca/longforms/incel-terrorism/?utm_source=pocket_mylist
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-australia-68822846 després que un pertorbat matés 6 dones en un centre comercial a Austràlia, trolls a X escampen que es tracta d’un jueu, i fan diners amb els anuncis. Tenim prejudicis i cliquem els que ho reforcen proporcionant-los ingressos, o reeleccions en cas de polítics. I així es crea un cercle viciós.
Google modifica l’algorime amb la idea d’evitar llocs sense valor que roben contingut dels altres, però molts comerços autèntics perden tràfic i clients. BBC
La UE regula per protegir els usuaris. Apple reacciona deixant fora la UE de les innovacions en AI. El Món
Desinformació sobre la desinformació. NewYorker.
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c1e8q50y3v7o hi ha gent que creu que els huracans són obra del govern per geoenginyeria
https://www.npr.org/2024/10/12/g-s1-28040/teens-tiktok-addiction-lawsuit-investigation-documents tiktok coneixia l’addicció dels adolescents
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c30p1p0j0ddo El satíric The Onion compra l’ultradreta infowars
meme your body, my choice https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/internet/nick-fuentes-confronted-home-body-choice-refrain-goes-viral-rcna179865