[2023 Abans teníem l’escala dels éssers, inanimat, animals, home. Ara diem que ho reduïm tot a física però tenim sistemes físics molt diferents: sistemes uniformes, sistemes vida: creació i reconstrucció de la complexitat (Schrödinger, cristalls no periòdics) sistemes amb consciència i llenguatge. causalitat basada en la imaginació]
[2024. La psicologia de la Gestalt va fer notar que identifiquem una melodia encara que la transposem -i en diferenrs arranjaments, ritmes, i timbres-, un altres exemple d’invariant i de fisicalisme no reduccionista].
[2025. Complement anàlisi sistemes amb nivells de psicologia i la possibilitat de causalitat top-down:
Layered ontology
- sistema simple: massa, càrrega, l’energia quantitat de moviment
- sistema amb energia pròpia, pila carregada, podem engegar o apagar, girar (roomba) + activació en funció de senyals i informació
- l’evolució du a sistemes orientats a “mantenir la complexitat” propagant els gens.
- l’evolució adquireix la transmissió de conducta (herència d’instints) i aprenentatge.
- 2025
amb els humans apareix, el llenguatge, transmissió cultural, la consciència i la narració. La propagació dels gens ara s’ajuda de la propagació dels mems, la propagació de la comunitat en la història, i la propagació de la narració personal. La narració ens impulsa a sobreviure però un cop hem aconseguit so¡breviure i cap als 35, passar la torxa de la vida a una altra generació, aquesta “eina” es troba una mica perduda perquè seguim vivint sense saber molt bé per a què, hem de servir l’espècie? la comunitat? les nostres sensacions de benestar? la nostra coherència narrativa? - Veure Cognició social i biaixos per una discussió de com l’experiment de Libet que el sistema automàtic ha actuat abans que en siguem conscients es limita a tasques simples, i que realment podem actuar per valors i projectes.
2025 Gazzaniga, emergència de propietats i causalitat top-down
L’intèrpret i l’experiència de jo agent
[D’una banda l’intèrpret de l’hemisferi esquerre del cervell ens proporciona una experiència de narració conscient en la que prenem decisions (jo invariants). De l’altra, sabem que la consciència apareix després que hagin tingut lloc tot de processos automàtics inconscients. És un epifenomen que no compta per a res?]
From what we learned in the last chapter, however, the modern perspective is that brains enable minds, and that YOU is your vastly parallel and distributed brain without a central command center. There is no ghost in the machine, no secret stuff that is YOU. That YOU that you are so proud of is a story woven together by your interpreter module to account for as much of your behavior as it can incorporate, and it denies or rationalizes the rest.
//If the universe and everything in it are following predetermined laws, then that seems to imply that individuals are not personally responsible for their actions. Go ahead and eat the Death by Chocolate cake, it was preordained about two billion years ago. Cheat on the test? You have no control over that—go ahead. Not getting along with your husband? Slip him some poison and say the universe made you do it. This is what caused such a stir when Newton presented his universal laws. I call this the Bleak View, but many scientists and determinists think this is the way things are. The rest of us just don’t believe it. “The universe made me buy that dress!” or “The universe made me buy that Boxster!”* just isn’t going to fly well at the dinner table. If we were to be logical neuroscientists, however, shouldn’t it? A Post Hoc World? We accept the idea that our bodies are humming along, being run by automatic systems that follow deterministic laws. Luckily, we don’t have to consciously digest our food, keep our heart beating, and our lungs oxygenating.
[Hawking deia que fins i tot els més creients en el determinisme miraven abans de travessar el carrer]
Lliure albir
[No volem ser marionetes manipulades de fora o per un rellotge interior que obri l’aixeta de neurotransmissors, però alhora volem determinisme i causalitat, justament ser lliure voldria dir “causar” estats de coses amb les accions resultat de les nostres eleccions]
what does it really mean to talk about free will? “Ah, well, we want to be free to make our own decisions.” Yes, but what do we want to be free from? We don’t want to be free from our experience of life, we need that for our decisions. We don’t want to be free from our temperament because that also guides our decisions. We actually don’t want to be free from causation, we use that for predictions.
[la qüestió doncs és: “els estats mentals que emergeixen, la narració, el projecte de vida, és rellevant? introdueix un nou tipus de causalitat? o bé és un epifenomen de les aixetes de neurotransmissors?]
“Mental states such as beliefs, thoughts, and desires all arise from brain activity and in turn can and do influence our decisions to act one way or another. Ultimately, these interactions will only be understood with a new vocabulary that captures the fact that two different layers of stuff are interacting in such a way that existing alone animates neither. As John Doyle at Caltech puts the issue, “[T]he standard problem is illustrated with hardware and software; software depends on hardware to work, but is also in some sense more ‘fundamental’ in that it is what delivers function. So what causes what? Nothing is mysterious here, but using the language of ‘cause’ seems to muddle it. We should probably come up with new and appropriate language rather than try to get into some Aristotelian categories.” Understanding this nexus and finding the right language to describe it represents, as Doyle says, “the hardest and most unique problem in science.”
Determinisme i límits, teoria del caos, mecànica quàntica
Les equacions de la mecànica són deterministes però com que no podem mesurar les condicions inicials amb infinita precisió, tenim sistemes en que una petita desviació no altera el decurs de les coses però en d’altres, sí, de manera que el sistema és caòtic. (Poincaré i els N-cossos (o tres), i Lorenz i la predicció del temps).
[Però igual que passa amb la mecànica quàntica, aquestes limitacions a la nostra capacitat de predicció no afectarien a la discussió]
Sistemes irreversibles lluny de l’equilibri i emergència
Prigogine va estudiar els sistemes irreversibles que dissipaven energia i que duien a noves propietats quan estaven lluny de l’equilibri .
“The smart aleck brings up the topic of emergence. Emergence is when micro-level complex systems that are far from equilibrium (thus allowing for the amplification of random events) self-organize (creative, self-generated, adaptability-seeking behavior) into new structures, with new properties that previously did not exist, to form a new level of organization on the macro level.16 There are two schools of thought on emergence. In weak emergence, the new properties arise as a result of the interactions at an elemental level and the emergent property is reducible to its individual components, that is, you can figure out the steps from one level to the next, which would be the deterministic view. Whereas, in strong emergence, the new property is irreducible, is more than the sum of its parts, and because of the amplification of random events, the laws cannot be predicted by an underlying fundamental theory or from an understanding of the laws of another level of organization.
Ilya Prigogine, however, was happy about one thing. He could identify the “arrow of time” as an emergent property that appears at a higher, macro, organizational level.
Àtoms i Newton
No podem predir el macro a partir del micro ni el micro a partir del macro. Per exemple, hi ha 11 tipus d’organització d’aigua glaç, però no els sabríem anticipar.This is even true for something as basic as water turning to ice, as physicist Robert Laughlin has pointed out: Ice has so far been found to have eleven distinct crystalline phases, but none of them were predicted by first principles!17 The balls in my living room are made up of atoms that behave as described by quantum mechanics, and when those microscopic atoms come together to form macroscopic balls, a new behavior emerges and that behavior is what Newton observed and described. It turns out that Newton’s laws aren’t fundamental, they are emergent; that is, they are what happens when quantum matter aggregates into macroscopic fluids and objects. It is a collective organizational phenomenon. The thing is, you can’t predict Newton’s laws from observing the behavior of atoms, nor the behavior of atoms from Newton’s laws.
neurones i estats mentals
Quantum mechanics are the rules for atoms, Newton’s laws are the rules for objects, and one couldn’t completely predict the other. So the question is whether we can take what we know from the micro level of neurophysiology about neurons and neurotransmitters and come up with a determinist model to predict conscious thoughts, the outcomes of brains, or psychology.
Can we derive the macro story from the micro story? I do not think so. I do not think that brain-state theorists, those neural reductionists who hold that every mental state is identical to some as-yet-undiscovered neural state, will ever be able to demonstrate.
Independència del suport, [hardware, software, realització múltiple]
That doesn’t explain it; it simply recognizes its reality or level of abstraction, like what happens when software and hardware interact, that mind is a somewhat independent property of brain while simultaneously being wholly dependent upon it.
Estudiant una llagosta s’ha vist per l’acció de moure’s hi huaria fins a 105 configuracions diferents compatibles [el mateix text en milers de tipus de lletra i colors diferents]
Reductionism in the physical sciences has been challenged by the principle of emergence. The whole system acquires qualitatively new properties that cannot be predicted from the simple addition of those of its individual components.
Emergència de propietats en el grup
Estudiant els motors dels cotxes no podríem predir els moviments de gent ni els embussos. Estudiant neurones no hauríem pogut predir el tango.
I think that we neuroscientists are looking at these capacities from the wrong organizational level. We are looking at them from the individual brain level, but they are emergent properties found in the group interactions of many brains.
[En filosofia de la ment jo havia notat que sovint assimilàvem la ment a un ordinador aïllat que modifica el seu software a partir de la interacció amb el món (càmera de vídeo, perifèrics). Però a la feina era evident que els ordinadors estaven en xarxa i rebien dels servidors de la xarxa el seu software. I els servidors es modificaven des d’un ordinador particular!]
Anderson,. More is different
Premi Nobel de Física d’estat sòlid assenyala que les propietats de conjunt grossos de partícules no es poden deduir de les propietats de les partícules elementals. En concret, aquestes presenten una simetria que els conjunts grossos han trencat.
La idea és que a mesura que creix el nombre de partícules, la matèria “will undergo mathematically sharp, singular ‘phase transitions’ to states in which the microscopic symmetries, and even the micorscopic equations of motion, are in a sense violated…. In this case we can see how the whole becomes not only more than but very different from the sum of its parts.
La Física, l’estudi de l’organització
“At some point we have to stop talking about decreasing symmetry and sart calling it increasing complication”
A” Different Universe”, Robert Laughlin, who won the Nobel Prize in Physics in 1998, said about the dawning of the understanding of emergence, “What we are seeing is a transformation of worldview in which the objective of understanding nature by breaking it down into ever smaller parts is supplanted by the objective of understanding how nature organizes itself.
[Però no hauríem pogut plantejar l’estudi de l’organització sense abans haver desmuntat el rellotge]
llibertat i responsabilitat
The same holds true for brains. Brains are automatic machines following decision pathways, but analyzing single brains in isolation cannot illuminate the capacity of responsibility. Responsibility is a dimension of life that comes from social exchange, and social exchange requires more than one brain. When more than one brain interacts, new and unpredictable things begin to emerge, establishing a new set of rules.
[i estudiant com es disparen neurones tampoc podríem donar raó de la vida narrativa]
Un estat mental M1 en pot causar un altre M2 o són sensacions que acompanyen els fets del cervell? (epifenomen)
There is a physical state, P1, at time 1, which produces a mental state, M1. Then after a bit of time, now time 2, there is another physical state, P2, which produces another mental state, M2. How do we get from M1 to M2? This is the conundrum. We know that mental states are produced from processes in the brain so that M1 does not directly generate M2 without involving the brain. If we just go from P1 to P2 then to M2, then our mental life is doing no work and we are truly just along for the ride. No one really likes that notion. The tough question is, does M1, in some downward-constraining process, guide P2, thus affecting M2?
Hi hauria una causalitat doble.
Howard Pattee, finds that a good example of upward and downward causation is the genotype-phenotype mapping of description to construction. It “requires the gene to describe the sequence of parts forming enzymes, and that description, in turn, requires the enzymes to read the description. . . . In its simplest logical form, the parts represented by symbols (codons) are, in part, controlling the construction of the whole (enzymes), but the whole is, in part, controlling the identification of the parts (translation) and the construction itself (protein synthesis).”
[un dèficit de neuro transmissors pot causar un estat de tristesa. L’estat mental de percebre la vida sense sentit pot influir els neurotransmissors]
Psicologia social 4 tipus de fet: un “organisme” amb “DNA” cultural, quines propietats emergeixen?